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ABSTRACT: The Schumpeterian hypothesis about the effect of firm size on research and 
development (R&D) output is studied for a sample of R&D projects for R&D-intensive 
firms that are small but have substantial variance in their sizes. Across the distribution of 
firm sizes, the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D ranged from 0.41 to 0.55, with 
the elasticities being largest for intermediate levels of firm size and also varying directly 
with the extent to which the projects are Schumpeterian in the cost or value senses.  The 
paper’s findings at the R&D project level are compared with the literature’s findings at 
the line of business, firm, and industry levels, and the findings are consistent with the 
literature’s findings for small firms.  
 
KEYWORDS: Patents, Research and Development (R&D), Firm Size, Schumpeterian 
hypothesis, Technological Progress, Innovation 
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1. Introduction 
Scherer (1965, 1967a, 1967b, 1970, pp. 346-399) provided the foundational 
papers that set the research agenda for scholarly investigations of the Schumpeterian 
hypotheses about seller concentration and rivalry in research and development (R&D) 
investments and about the advantages of firm size for R&D investments.  His subsequent 
research and reviews of the literature about the Schumpeterian hypotheses (Scherer, 
1980, pp. 407-458, 1983a, 1983b, 1984a, 1984b; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Scherer 
and Ross, 1990, pp. 613-660) have furthered our understanding of these issues and 
extended the breadth and scope of related research agendas.  In the context of Scherer’s 
foundational work, this paper not only complements the existing literature but also 
provides a new perspective on the Schumpeterian hypothesis about firm size.1   
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows:  In Section 2, we discuss the 
Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis with regard to the advantages of firm size for the 
performance of R&D investments, and we explain the theory that underlies our new test 
of that hypothesis.  Section 3 describes the sample of research projects in small R&D-
intensive firms that we use to test our hypothesis.  Section 4 presents the associated 
econometric model;  also in Section 4 are definitions of the variables in our estimation, 
relevant descriptive statistics, and a discussion of the estimates.  Section 5 compares our 
findings to the findings in the literature about the Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis.  
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and emphasizes the ways in which our analysis 
both complements the extant literature about the Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis as 
well as extends it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Scott and Scott (2014) examine the Schumpeterian hypothesis about innovation rivalry 
in the context of Scherer’s foundational work. 
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2. The Schumpeterian Firm-Size Hypothesis 
Simply stated, the Schumpeterian hypothesis about firm size (Scherer, 1970, pp. 
352-362) is that large firms will be more effective than small firms in generating 
technological progress.  Scherer’s seminal 1970 treatise also provides an assessment of 
the evidence at that time—an assessment that was updated in Scherer (1980), Baldwin 
and Scott (1987), Scherer and Ross (1990), and Cohen (2010).   
In addition to Scherer’s foundational studies cited in Section 1, there have been 
many other contributions to the literature about the Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis.  
Some of these have compared the R&D activity and performance of small as contrasted 
with large firms.2  Others have focused on differences across the range of sizes for large 
firms.3 
Within the context of this literature, we focus on small firms and measure the 
research output from R&D investments in terms of the patents that result, controlling for 
the differences in the use and quality of patents across technologies with dummy 
variables, as suggested by Griliches (1990).4  For our sample of small firms, we ask if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Prominent examples include Link (1980), Bound et al. (1984), Pakes and Griliches 
(1984), and Acs and Audretsch (1988). 
3 Here some prominent examples are Comanor (1967), Scherer (1983a, 1984b), Lunn and 
Martin (1986), Cohen and Klepper (1992, 1996a, 1996b), and Cohen et al. (1987). 
4 Schmookler (1966) advocates the use of patent statistics as a measure of research 
output.  Griliches (1990) reviews patents as a measure of R&D output and observes 
(1990, pp. 1701-1702): “Among the major findings was the discovery of a strong 
relationship between patent numbers and R&D expenditures in the cross-sectional 
dimension, implying that patents are a good indicator of differences in inventive activity 
across different firms.”  He also observes (1990, p. 1669): “The dream of getting hold of 
an output indicator of inventive activity is one of the strong motivating forces for 
economic research in this area. . . . One recognizes, of course, the presence of a whole 
host of problems: Not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, and 
the inventions that are patented differ greatly in “quality,” in the magnitude of inventive 
output associated with them.  The first two problems, one thinks, can be taken care of by 
industry dummy variables, or by limiting the analysis to a particular sector or industry.  
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size of a firm affects the relationship between research output—as measured by patents—
and the firm’s R&D investment.5  The effect of firm size indicates how Schumpeterian 
the R&D activity is in the cost sense and/or the value sense (Kohn and Scott, 1982). 
Although we consider patents to be a measure, albeit an imperfect one, of 
research output, the Kohn and Scott theory of the way that firm size affects—via a cost 
sense and/or a value sense—R&D activity applies equally well whether the activity is 
measured with R&D outputs or instead with R&D inputs.6   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For the third, one tries to invoke the help of the “law of large numbers”: “The economic . 
. . significance of any sampled patent can also be interpreted as a random variable with 
some probability distribution” (Scherer 1965, p. 1098).”  See also Comanor and Scherer 
(1969, p. 393) who observe that a patent’s “. . . underlying economic or technological 
significance can be interpreted as a random variable with some probability distribution” 
and use an examination of pharmaceutical manufacturing firms’ invention patents, R&D 
personnel, and the value of new product sales to ask “whether a simple count of the 
number of patents reflects only statistical noise or whether there is a meaningful message 
in the results”.  They find support for a meaningful message in statistically significant 
correlations between patent counts and the employment of research personnel and the 
sales of new products. 
5 In this paper, we study patents as a random count variable.  Of importance for the issue 
of the quality of the counted patents is the distribution of the value of patents, where that 
value is a random variable.  On the distribution of that value, see Harhoff et al. (1999), 
Scherer et al. (2000), and Harhoff et al. (2003); the ideas in these papers suggest that an 
interesting extension of the present paper would be to replace our patent counts for each 
R&D project with the use of quality-weighted patent counts, where quality is determined 
by the citations to the patents.  We could then examine the effect of firm size on the 
elasticity of the quality of R&D output with respect to the R&D inputs. 
6	  That is fortunate, because, as William Comanor has emphasized to us in personal 
correspondence, what patent statistics actually measure is not at all clear, and rather than 
measuring research output, patenting may be an important intermediate step between 
R&D and innovation, and indeed may be a better measure of research input than of 
research output.  In this paper we study the effect of firm size on R&D activity where the 
activity is measured by patenting.  We think of patenting as an imperfect measure of 
research output, but the theory of how firm size affects R&D activity is valid whether or 
not patenting is thought of as a measure of innovative output or as an intermediate input 
in the innovation process.	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In Figure 1, we depict the marginal value (MV) of R&D output and also the 
marginal cost (MC) of R&D output, when R&D output is measured by patents.7  For a 
firm of size S0, the R&D output is P0 where the marginal value (MV|S0) and marginal cost 
(MC) of effort are equal.  For a larger firm of size S1, the R&D output, P1, is greater 
along MC because the marginal value (MV|S1) of R&D output has increased (shifted to 
the right).8   
Kohn and Scott (1982) offer the following statement of the Schumpeterian firm-
size hypothesis: In more Schumpeterian industries (in our context, with more 
Schumpeterian R&D projects), the elasticity of R&D output with respect to firm size will 
be greater when the industry (or the R&D project) is more Schumpeterian in the value 
sense or the cost sense.  For the value sense, a more Schumpeterian project will have its 
MV curve shift up further as firm size increases.  So, for the firm depicted in Figure 1, if 
the R&D project is more Schumpeterian in the value sense, MV shifts to MV|S1* and 
R&D output increases to P1*.  If the R&D activity is more Schumpeterian in the cost 
sense, then the MC curve shifts down more steeply, as with MC ∇ .  Thus, if the R&D 
activity is more Schumpeterian in the value sense only, output is P1*; if the activity is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Figure 1 in Kohn and Scott (1982, p. 247) shows R&D output on the horizontal axis, 
and thus depicts the marginal value and the marginal cost of the R&D output; in our 
empirical model, we measure that output with patents.  However, as Kohn and Scott 
(1982, p. 246) explain, because the R&D output is an increasing function of the R&D 
input, the discussion can also be stated in terms of the R&D input, with R&D effort 
measured on the horizontal axis of Figure 1.  Thus, the Kohn and Scott theory that relates 
firm size to R&D activity applies equally well to R&D input as to R&D output.  That is 
especially important because Comanor and Scherer (1969, p. 397) conclude that “it may 
be that patents are a better measure of research input than output.”  Thus, although we 
interpret patents as a measure of R&D outputs, the theory by which we relate firm size to 
R&D activity holds equally well for explaining the relation of firm size to R&D inputs or 
to R&D outputs, and so our hypothesized relations hold if patents measure inputs rather 
than outputs. 
8 If MC is constant, then R&D activity is not Schumpeterian in the cost sense.   
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more Schumpeterian in the cost sense only, output is P ∇1 ; and if output is more 
Schumpeterian in both the value and the cost senses, the firm’s R&D output (measured 
by patenting in the empirical work of this paper) increases even more as the firm’s size 
increases and equals P ∇*1 .   
In all, the test of the Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis that Kohn and Scott 
(1982) propose is whether the elasticity of R&D activity with respect to firm size is 
greater when the R&D activity is more Schumpeterian in the cost or the value senses.  
Building from Kohn and Scott (1982), we construct such a test, and it is that test that 
provides our new perspective on the Schumpeterian hypothesis about firm size.   
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3. Sample of Small R&D Firms 
The data that are analyzed in this paper come from a representative sample of the 
U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Phase II Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) projects.9  The sample was assembled by the National Research Council (NRC) 
of the National Academies for the NRC’s 2005 evaluation of the SBIR programs.10  The 
NRC’s sample of DOE projects has 436 randomly surveyed SBIR Phase II projects from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Phase I awards are small and are intended to assist firms assess the feasibility of an 
idea’s scientific and commercial potential in response to the funding agency’s objectives 
and they generally last for six-months.    Phase II awards are focused on the initial steps 
toward commercialization, and they generally last for two years.   Link and Scott (2012, 
pp. 19-32) provide a detailed description of the SBIR program and its Phase I and Phase 
II awards. 
10	  The scope of the NRC 2005 database was limited to Phase II SBIR awards by the 
largest five agencies that participated in the SBIR program.  The other agencies are the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation 
(NSF).  Collectively, these five agencies funded 11,214 SBIR Phase II projects during the 
scope of the NRC study (1992 through 2001).   Among those projects, DOE had 808 or 
7.21 percent of the total number.   
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DOE’s SBIR Phase II projects over the period from 1992 through 2001.  There were 154 
responses from the random sample.11  Our analysis focuses on the 154 responses for 
which we have all of the data.  Table 1 describes the process that reduced the population 
of DOE SBIR Phase II projects to the random sample of 436 projects and then ultimately 
to the 154 responses comprising our sample.12 
Of the five agencies for which the NRC gathered data about SBIR Phase II 
projects, DOE’s projects seemed the most appropriate for the study of the Schumpeterian 
firm-size hypothesis.  The projects of the other agencies are influenced by institutional 
characteristics that could make results for our firm-size hypothesis test less general.  For 
the SBIR projects of the DoD and NASA, there is a military/defense focus; for NIH 
projects, there is an academic research focus; and the NSF projects have a special 
noncommercial research focus.  The commercial energy-related focus for the DOE SBIR 
projects seems broadly attuned to private sector R&D efforts.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Link and Scott (2012, pp. 33-43, 128-130) provide detailed discussion and description 
of the NRC’s 2005 SBIR sampling strategy and the resulting samples and explain the 
data reduction process that resulted in the samples of projects from DoD, NIH, NASA, 
DOE, and NSF.  Also Link and Scott (2012) estimate a Probit model of response to the 
NRC’s survey.  The response model estimates well, with variables such as the project’s 
age and the number of Phase II awards that the firm had over the period from 1992 to 
2001 being important for response.  However, for variables that describe the 
commercialization of the Phase II project’s results and for the patent variable that we use 
in the present paper, the correlation of the error in the model of response and in the model 
of substantive interest is low; consequently, response bias is not an issue.  For an 
explanation of the absence of selection bias when the error in the equation that 
determines the sample selection is uncorrelated with the error in the equation of primary 
interest, see Greene (2012, pp. 872-876); for an example, see Link and Scott (2009, pp. 
271, 274).	  
12 See note a of Table 1 in particular. 
13 As with all agencies’ SBIR programs, DOE states 
(http://science.energy.gov/sbir/about/ accessed July 23, 2016) that it pursues the four 
legislated goals for the SBIR program: to stimulate technological innovation; use small 
business to meet Federal research and R&D needs; foster participation by small 
businesses that are socially and economically disadvantaged and those that are women-
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In addition to the focus on DOE SBIR projects, our sample of R&D projects has 
three unique characteristics:  First, at the level of the performance of the R&D project—
and that is the level of activity that we observe—the firms in our sample are in a sense in 
the same industry.  More specifically, the industry is the set of R&D-intensive firms that 
allocate science and engineering resources to provide contract commercial research 
services of R&D projects that are aimed at developing technologies that meet the goals of 
the DOE—or more generally, the goals of U.S. government agencies that participate in 
the SBIR programs.14  Using an internet search, we examined each observation to find 
descriptions of the projects and the firms that performed them.  Many of the firms are 
solely performing commercial research services for whatever targets of opportunity 
appear, and the remaining firms are devoting a subset of their science and engineering 
resources to such activity.  Further, the SBIR Phase II award process is competitive.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
owned; and increase the commercialization of innovation that is derived from Federal 
support for R&D.  For details of these legislated goals that all agencies’ SBIR programs 
address, see Link and Scott (2012, pp. 21-24); DOE’s particular emphasis is on 
technologies that address energy-related concerns such as environmental concerns of 
promoting clean, renewable energy.  DOE emphasizes commercialization, which requires 
an evaluation of commercial potential in Phase I and Phase II applications.  The Bayh-
Dole Act (P. L. 96-517, Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980) applies, and 
government grants then lead to privately held patents, although the DOE retains certain 
rights in those patents that allow it to license the technology.  On the history, legislation, 
and implementation of Bayh-Dole, see Scherer (2009). 
14 The Census assigns the primary category for many of these firms as “commercial 
physical research” (SIC 8731) or “research and development in the physical, engineering, 
and life sciences (except biotechnology)” (NAICS 541712).  Others have portions of their 
firms that are devoted to such activity to expand their sales opportunities.  The firms all 
use SBIR funding for their R&D project, but venture capital and other sources of capital 
are also used in some cases.  Additional understanding of small, R&D-intensive, SBIR-
supported firms, including their views about venture capital, is provided in case studies 
(e.g., see Wessner, 2000, pp. 104-140, and the material there from discussions with the 
principals of the SBIR firms).   
	   	   10	  
This first point is important because we focus on the Schumpeterian firm-size 
hypothesis, which applies most convincingly to samples of R&D projects where the 
performing firms of different sizes are competing broadly in the same industry.  It is the 
industry that is characterized by how Schumpeterian R&D activity is in the value sense 
and in the cost sense; there is then, as is illustrated in Figure 1, variance in R&D activity 
across the industry’s firms of various sizes, with a larger responsiveness of the activity to 
firm size when the industry is more Schumpeterian in either or both senses.15   
Another reason to limit attention to a single industry is that the scope of patenting 
is very different among industries.  For example, patenting is very important in 
pharmaceuticals, but less important in many other industries.16    
We are asking if and how firm size affects the productivity of R&D efforts, 
however measured.  The theory that we have discussed and illustrated in Figure 1 implies 
that the Schumpeterian hypothesis would apply in some circumstances but not others—
namely, it should apply in industries that are Schumpeterian in either or both the value 
sense and the cost sense.  Where our industry fits with regard to the importance of firm 
size for R&D activity is a matter that our examination of the elasticity of patenting with 
respect to firm size will reveal.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See the discussion in Kohn and Scott (1982, p. 248). 
16 See Cohen (2010, pp. 183-185), and also see Henderson and Cockburn (1996, pp. 48-
49) for a discussion and an illustration, in the context of their study of the 
pharmaceuticals industry, of the importance of controls for differences in technological 
opportunities when explaining patenting—in their case across different therapeutic 
classes (such as arthritis and related disorders as compared with anti-infectives).  In Link 
and Scott (2013), we have shown that patents are important for the commercialization 
success (as measured by the firm’s employment growth that resulted because of the 
research project) of the small, research-intensive firms that participated in the SBIR 
program. 
	   	   11	  
Second, there is heterogeneity in the sizes of the small firms, as measured by 
employment at the time of their proposals for their Phase II award to DOE.  Firm sizes 
ranged from 1 to 451 employees.  The mean number of employees was 32.6, with 
standard deviation of 59.0 employees.  
Third, there is also heterogeneity in R&D investments (inclusive of the SBIR 
support for the project).17  For our sample of projects, total R&D investments in constant 
year 2015 dollars averaged $2,353,115, with the standard deviation being $4,827,214 and 
the range being from $538,000 to $41,900,000.   
4. Model, Descriptive Statistics, and Empirical Findings 
In this section we formalize the framework from which we test our Schumpeterian 
firm-size hypothesis in the context of our sample of small, R&D-intensive firms.  
Specifically, we explore: 1) whether the research output from the sampled DOE SBIR 
projects is a function of the R&D investments in the projects; and 2) whether the effect of 
R&D investment on research output depends on the sizes of the firms that performed the 
R&D. 
Our measure of the research output of each R&D project is, as illustrated by 
Figure 1, the number of patent applications, P, based on the knowledge that is generated 
by the project.  The R&D investment, R, in the project is the total (private and public) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In addition to the Phase II SBIR award, the total investment funding for the R&D 
project includes non-SBIR federal funds, private investment funds (U.S. venture capital, 
foreign investment, other private equity, other domestic private company), other sources 
of funding including state or local governments and colleges or universities, any own 
company funding, including borrowed funds, and personal funds. 
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R&D investment in the Phase II SBIR project; R is measured in constant dollars of the 
year 2015.18 
We test the hypothesis that firm size significantly affects the relationship between 
R&D investment, R,	  in a project and the research output, as measured by the number of 
patent applications, P.  The number of patent applications (hereafter, simply patents) is a 
count variable.19  An appropriate model for our hypothesis test is the negative binomial 
model.  The variables measuring the R&D investment for the project and the firm’s size 
are entered as their natural logarithms because, as they increase, their effects on patenting 
are expected to diminish.  Thus, we discuss each variable and the functional form for the 
expected number of patents, where that expected number for each project can be 
represented, with exp(x)  denoting ex , the base for the natural logarithms raised to the power 
x, with x denoting the collection of terms in the very long parenthetical expression that we will 
define, as: 
P = exp(β0 +β1 lnR+β2 lnS lnR+β3B lnS lnR+β4A lnS lnR+β5PhI lnS lnR
+β6PhII lnS lnR+ τ jTjj≠1∑ lnS lnR+β7B+β8A+β9PhI +β10PhII + α jTjj≠1∑
+β11NE +β12MW +β13South)
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We follow the recommendation of Jankowski (1993, p. 204) and convert the nominal 
R&D expenditures for each sampled project to constant 2015 dollars by using the Gross 
National Product implicit price deflator (https://fred.stlouisfed.org; accessed July 6, 
2016).  
19 We consider patent applications to be a better indication of the output developed in the 
projects of these small firms than patents received.  Patent applications indicate results 
for which the firms considered intellectual property worthwhile and are not subject to the 
vagaries of the process of ultimately granting a patent.  The two variables are similar in 
any case.  For the 146 observations for which the data are available, the number of 
patents applications averaged 0.83 with standard deviation 1.62 and a range from 0 to 13; 
the number of patents received averaged 0.61 with a standard deviation of 1.19 and a 
range from 0 to 10.   
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Turning now to the discussion of the variables in the parenthetical expression, the 
expected number of patents from a project is represented as a function of the R&D 
investment R in the project, and the effect of that R&D investment depends on the size S 
of the firm as represented by interaction terms in the equation above.  In our theory, the 
effect of firm size on R&D output results from firm size affecting the impact of R&D 
investment on R&D output, having a larger positive impact when the R&D project is 
more Schumpeterian in the cost and value senses.  The size of the firm is measured by the 
firm’s employment at the time that it applied for the Phase II SBIR award.20  
The impact of firm size on the effect of R&D investment depends on the 
technology Tj of the project and on the extent to which the R&D project is Schumpeterian 
in the value sense and the cost sense. As we discuss below, the variables PhI and PhII 
capture technology effects; the variables B and A capture independent Schumpeterian 
effects.  We explain these variables below. The variables B, A, PhI, PhII, and Tj enter the 
equation in both interaction terms (for slope effects) and as independent (intercept) 
effects.  The model also controls for regional effects in the number of patents. 
The technology effects are for the different technologies (Tj for the technology 
areas into which our DOE projects fall, with the technology area for “Measuring & 
testing” subsumed in the intercept).  The classification of the DOE SBIR projects to 
technology classes was accomplished by comparing the project descriptions with the 
classification system used by the U.S. Patent Office (United States Patent and Trademark 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The firms were asked to provide the number of employees when the Phase II proposal 
was submitted.  Some of the firms were just beginning their existence, and in some of 
those cases, the incipient firms reported zero employees.  Knowing that someone was 
working for the young firm in its incipiency—someone wrote the proposal for the Phase 
II SBIR award—we have defined S as the reported number (at the time the firm applied 
for its SBIR Phase II award) of employees plus 1. 
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Office, 2016).21  The regional effects are for the different geographic areas (the U.S. 
Census regions, Northeast, NE, Midwest, MW, South, South, and West, West, with the 
effect for the West subsumed in the intercept).   
To explore the alternative circumstances associated with the impact of firm size 
on the effectiveness of R&D investment on patenting, we use the following variables.  
The variable B denotes business founders.  It is 1 if the firm had founders with a business 
background and is zero otherwise.  The variable A denotes academic founders.  It is 1 if 
the firm had founders with an academic background and is zero otherwise.22  The 
variable PhI denotes the number of previous related Phase I SBIR awards, and the 
variable PhII denotes the number of previous related Phase II SBIR awards.23  
All of the variables are defined in Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Although the classification system is not good for defining meaningful industries, it is 
good for our purpose of assigning the projects to technology groups (see the discussion in 
footnote 4—we need to control for the differences in use and quality of patents across 
technologies).  In addition to the technology area, “Measuring & testing,” left in the 
intercept, the technology areas to which the DOE SBIR projects have been assigned are 
listed in Table 4. 
22 Of course, in some cases a firm will have founders with academic backgrounds and 
also founders with business backgrounds, and in such cases we anticipate the R&D 
projects would have characteristics that are associated with the human capital of each 
type of founder. 
23 Of course, the variables PhI and PhII are highly correlated: Their correlation 
coefficient is 0.808.  However, although all related Phase II projects are expected also to 
have Phase I projects that the firm would report as related, not all Phase I projects 
succeed and result in a Phase II project.  Thus, using the two variables, we have the 
variance across projects in the number of related Phase I projects, given the number of 
related Phase II projects.  The number of related Phase I projects can be much more for 
some of our observed R&D projects because of many failures of Phase I projects for each 
Phase II award won.  In fact, as seen in the descriptive statistics of Table 3, for our 
sample’s R&D projects, the mean number of related Phase I projects is somewhat more 
than twice the mean number of related Phase II projects. 	  
	   	   15	  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables.24   Observe the different 
range and levels for the variables for accumulated technical capital, PhI and PhII, and 
note the variance in the amount of R&D investment for the projects.  Also, observe the 
wide range in the sizes of the sampled firms, all of which are small.  In Section 5, we 
shall make detailed use of the range in the sizes of the firms.    
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We hypothesize that in some circumstances a larger firm size will be helpful for 
successful patenting by the R&D-intensive small firm, while in other circumstances size 
is associated with less success.  In particular, following the discussion in Section 2 and 
the illustration in Figure 1, when the small firms’ R&D projects are carried out in 
circumstances that are more Schumpeterian in the cost sense or the value sense, the 
elasticity of patenting with respect to firm size is expected to be greater than when 
circumstances are less Schumpeterian. 
To explore alternatives, we hypothesize that when the founders of the small firms 
have business backgrounds, circumstances will be more Schumpeterian in the value sense 
because the R&D projects will tend to be those for which the marketing, sales, and 
distribution machinery of a larger firm would be especially helpful for increasing the 
marginal value of R&D output.25  Business founders are likely to be more Schumpeterian 
when the R&D project is aimed at creating a new process for an established market that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Instead of simply providing the descriptive statistics for only the 125 observations for 
which we have all of the variables needed for the estimation in Table 3, we have shown 
in Table 4 the descriptive statistics for the all of the observations for which the patent 
variable is available.  The richness of the description of the sample thereby enabled 
comes with the cost of the intricate footnote to the table. 
25 Note that the business founders—the owners—still have access and control in these 
small entrepreneurial firms.  Indeed, in our experience interviewing the principals of 
SBIR firms, the founders often “wear all the hats” and are deeply involved of all aspects 
of the small firm’s operations. 
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can be advantageously exploited in-house with a firm’s own production.  This argument 
also holds for a new product where marketing is key.   
In contrast, when the founders of the small firms have academic backgrounds, we 
hypothesize that marketing and sales and in-house exploitation are less important, and the 
projects entail more basic science with output that is more generic, with value less 
dependent on the size of the firm to exploit the R&D output.  Thus, with academic 
founders, we expect the R&D projects will have output for which the small firm can 
readily get agreements with outsiders for marketing, sales, and distribution or for 
production.  Thus, the small firm’s own marketing, sales, and production expertise is not 
necessary, and the circumstances for the R&D projects will be less Schumpeterian in the 
value sense.26 
We also hypothesize that, for projects with academic founders, the marginal cost 
of R&D output will fall less steeply as the R&D output increases; the MC curve in Figure 
1 will be flatter, and the marginal cost of R&D output does not fall rapidly as that output 
increases.  We hypothesize the flatter marginal cost curve in Figure 1 because the cost of 
finding additional knowledge with academic founders is less likely to be a simple matter 
of exploring different directions for knowledge already acquired and instead is the pursuit 
of more basic knowledge that opens up new areas of exploration. 
Other things being the same, we further hypothesize that firms that have had 
many related Phase II SBIR projects have R&D projects that are more Schumpeterian in 
the cost sense than will be the case for firms with fewer related Phase II projects.  The 
marginal cost of R&D output is expected to fall more rapidly as output increases because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 There are many different ways that the small, SBIR firms use agreements with outside 
firms and financiers to exploit commercially their innovations.  See Link and Scott (2012, 
pp. 91-102). 
	   	   17	  
the R&D project will be building on the firm’s existing knowledge base and exploiting 
ideas established in earlier projects.  An additional new increment to knowledge—and an 
additional new patent—will cost less for the firm with a larger number of related Phase II 
SBIR R&D projects. 
Given the number of a firm’s related Phase II projects, we expect that firms with a 
larger number of related Phase I projects will have R&D projects that are less 
Schumpeterian in the cost sense than will be the case for firms with fewer related Phase I 
projects.  Other things being the same, having more related Phase I projects means that 
there have been more failures in the process of taking the first look at the possibilities for 
an R&D project.  There are more exploratory looks at possibilities to find feasible Phase 
II R&D projects, and more costs to find the feasible projects imply that the marginal costs 
of R&D output do not fall as steeply as the output increases. 
To help bring into focus the foregoing arguments, we summarize by observing 
that we hypothesize that the accumulated human capital of firms will matter.  Firms with 
academic founders may—because of the nature of their projects and the firm’s 
personnel—need to remain small and focused in order to have an R&D project succeed 
and lead to patents; their projects are expected to be less Schumpeterian in the value 
sense and in the cost sense.  In contrast, firms with business founders are expected have 
R&D projects that are more Schumpeterian in the value sense.   
Summarizing further, we hypothesize that accumulated technical capital—the 
firm’s experience base that characterizes each project—will matter.  Controlling for the 
number of previous Phase II projects in a technology area related to the current Phase II 
project, a larger number of related Phase I projects in that area necessarily implies larger 
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R&D portfolios with fewer successes in the sense of initial research developing into the 
Phase II R&D project.   
Thus, in these cases, the R&D activities would be less Schumpeterian in the cost 
sense because the marginal costs of R&D efforts are declining less rapidly for the firms 
that are undertaking more Phase I projects to find the Phase II projects that are worth 
investing in.  Controlling for the number of related Phase I awards won, firms with many 
related SBIR Phase II projects (hence, Phase I awards that were successful and generated 
the follow-on Phase II awards) may have the experience and portfolio of projects that 
imply that the marginal costs of R&D output fall more rapidly as that output increases.  
With many related Phase II awards, a firm’s R&D activity would be expected to be more 
Schumpeterian in the cost sense. 
Table 4 shows our empirical results.  There are three specifications: the first with 
the technology effects’ having only an impact on the intercept, and the second with the 
technology effects’ having both intercept and slope effects.  For the second specification, 
technology effects are estimated only for the technologies that have significant effects in 
the first specification, with any effects for the remaining technologies left in the 
intercept.27  The third specification drops the regional effects because they are not 
significant; they are not significant individually, and the chi-squared statistics with three 
degrees of freedom for their joint significance are 2.91 (against the null hypothesis, the 
probability of a greater chi-squared = 0.406) in the first specification and 2.64 
(probability of a greater chi-squared = 0.451) in the second. Studies of innovative small 
businesses have often anticipated and controlled for regional effects in the firms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The technology effects as a whole are significant.  The Wald test statistic against the 
null hypothesis that all of the effects are zero gives the chi-squared statistic with 12 
degrees of freedom = 1684.31 with the probability of a greater chi-squared = 0.0000. 
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behavior, and so we present the specifications with those effects controlled as well as the 
specification without them. The standard errors are robust and are adjusted for clusters by 
firm because for some firms, multiple Phase II SBIR projects are sampled.  The 
clustering allows for intra-group correlation in the errors for the multiple projects of a 
firm.  The estimation also uses the sample weights (also called probability weights) that 
were explained and shown in Table 1. 
For all of our specifications in Table 4, the results of the estimation are essentially 
the same.  In Section 5, we report the magnitudes of the effects.  Here we provide an 
overview of the directions for the effects in the context of our theory in Section 2.   
First, the number of patents applied for increases with R&D investment in the 
project.28   
Second, the positive effect of R&D on patenting is greater for larger firms.   
Third, as hypothesized, the effect of firm size on R&D investment’s effect on 
patenting is less when the R&D activity is less Schumpeterian in the cost or value 
senses—discussed in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 1—as indicated by the variables 
that we have used to characterize less Schumpeterian cases—namely, A and PhI reduce 
the impact of firm size on R&D’s impact on patenting.   
Fourth, as we hypothesized, R&D activity is more Schumpeterian when PhII is 
larger, other things being the same, and indeed, when PhII is larger, the impact of firm 
size on the effect of R&D on patenting is positive.  However, contrary to our expectation, 
the hypothesized impact of B (a slope effect—that is, an impact on the effect that firm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In personal correspondence (July 22, 2016), F.M. Scherer observes that although—for 
our sample of small firms—this result is unlikely to have been caused by the presence of 
in-house lawyers (available in a sense at zero marginal cost), possibly the somewhat 
larger small firms have more experience with patent law and lawyers and hence bear a 
smaller psychological cost in applying for patents. 
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size has on the relationship between R&D investment and patenting) is not positive.  Via 
its intercept effect, B does have a positive impact on patenting, but the hypothesized 
positive impact of B on firm size’s effect is not supported because the slope effect for B is 
negative.   
The hypothesized slope effects for B, A, PhI, and PhII are grounded in the 
hypothesis that the responsiveness of R&D output to R&D investment will be greater as 
firm size increases when the R&D project is more Schumpeterian in the value and cost 
senses.  The responsiveness will be less as firm size increases when the project is less 
Schumpeterian.   
The estimation results in Table 4 support the hypothesized effects, except for the 
variable B.  The intercept effect for these variables is what we would expect.  The human 
capital associated with founders with experience in business or academics is associated 
with an intercept effect that shows more patenting, other things being the same.  Thus, 
apart from any relationship between human capital and the effect of a firm’s size on the 
R&D-patenting relationship, more human capital, whether from business experience or 
academic experience, is associated with more patents.   
The technical capital that is associated with more related Phase I projects has a 
positive intercept effect, as would be expected, because for the knowledge input into the 
R&D project there will have been more research at the basic, exploratory end of the 
research spectrum to inform patentable ideas from the Phase II project’s R&D.  The 
negative intercept effect for more related Phase II projects might be expected because, at 
the applied end of the research spectrum, the additional technical capital from numerous 
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related Phase II projects will make it more likely that patentable ideas have already been 
patented. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
5. Comparison with Findings in the Literature 
Using the estimated models in Table 4, we next present examples to show the 
magnitudes for the elasticities that have been estimated.29 
Our model for the expected number of patent applications is: 
P = exp(β0 +β1 lnR+β2 lnS lnR+β3B lnS lnR+β4A lnS lnR+β5PhI lnS lnR
+β6PhII lnS lnR+ τ jTjj≠1∑ lnS lnR+β7B+β8A+β9PhI +β10PhII + α jTjj≠1∑
+β11NE +β12MW +β13South)
 
















'= β1 +β2 lnS +β3B lnS +β4A lnS +β5PhI lnS +β6PhII lnS + τ jTj lnSj≠1∑ 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The literature has developed alternative ways to look at the count variable for patents 
in a model estimating elasticities, given that for many observations the number of patents 
is zero.  For example, Bound et al. (1984, p. 39) observe that they want to include the 
zero observations in their estimation and will treat the issue in two ways.  One (p. 39) is 
to “set log patents to zero for all zero patent observations and allow those firms to have a 
separate intercept” in the regressions.  The other is (1984, p. 41): “Second, we model the 
patents properly as a counts (Poisson) variable, taking on values 1, 2, 3, etc. . . .”  In our 
paper we use the negative binomial model, which is a generalization of the Poisson 
model.  Bound et al. actually use the negative binomial because it is needed given the 
“overdispersion” present for the patent count variable.  Observe that with the formal 
treatment of the dependent variable as a count variable in the negative binomial 
(Poisson) context, there is no need to take the log of the zero observations.  Given the 
functional form of ex in a maximum likelihood estimation, the constant and the 
coefficients for the explanatory variables are chosen so that the “x” for the zero patent 
observations is sufficiently negative that the predicted patents can be close to zero and 
even essentially so if that outcome for the choice of the constant and other parameters 
maximizes the likelihood function.  Scherer (1983a) provides another alternative—cubic 
equations, linear in the parameters estimated but nonlinear in the variables—that 
estimates the elasticities without the need to use the natural logarithms of the variables.  
	   	   22	  
Observe	  several	  points	  about	  the	  functional	  form	  for	  patents.	  	  With	  its	  interaction	  
terms	  for	  the	  logarithms	  of	  firm	  size	  and	  R&D	  investment,	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  elasticity	  of	  
patents	  with	  respect	  to	  R&D	  investment	  is	  a	  function	  of	  firm	  size,	  and	  also	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
other	  variables	  depend	  on	  firm	  size.	  	  The	  cross-­‐partial	  effects	  of	  firm	  size	  on	  the	  elasticity	  of	  
patents	  with	  respect	  to	  R&D	  are	  diminishing.	  	  Further,	  the	  elasticity	  of	  patents	  with	  respect	  
to	  firm	  size	  (that	  we	  examine	  subsequently)	  is	  a	  function	  of	  R&D	  investment,	  and	  in	  this	  
case	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  other	  variables	  will	  depend	  on	  R&D	  investment,	  and	  the	  cross-­‐partial	  
effects	  of	  R&D	  on	  the	  elasticity	  of	  patents	  with	  respect	  to	  size	  are	  diminishing.	  	  There	  is	  a	  
direct	  effect	  of	  R&D	  on	  patenting,	  but	  firm	  size	  affects	  patenting	  only	  through	  its	  (value	  and	  
cost)	  effects	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  R&D	  investment	  on	  patenting.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  parameters	  
estimated,	  these	  elasticities	  may	  be	  large	  or	  small,	  and	  the	  logarithmic	  metric	  for	  R&D	  
investment	  and	  for	  firm	  size	  limits	  the	  influence	  of	  unusually	  large	  R&D	  investments	  or	  
unusually	  large	  firms	  (there	  are	  some	  very	  large	  observations	  for	  the	  two	  variables	  as	  seen	  
in	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  Table	  3)	  in	  our	  sample	  of	  small	  firms.	  	  Once	  we	  have	  
estimated	  the	  model,	  we	  observe	  its	  predictions	  for	  various	  firm	  sizes	  or	  R&D	  investments	  
using	  the	  actual	  values	  of	  all	  of	  the	  variables	  for	  observations	  with	  those	  various	  sizes	  or	  
investments. 
To	  estimate	  the	  elasticity	  of	  patent	  applications	  with	  respect	  to	  R&D	  investment	  
using	  the	  second	  specification	  in	  Table	  4	  and the actual observations in the sample, we 
calculate the elasticity for each R&D project as:  
0.472 + 0.0330×lnS – 0.0279×B×lnS – 0.0302×A×lnS – 0.00494×PhI×lnS + 
0.0156×PhII×lnS + 0.0323×Calculators×lnS – 0.0368×Electro-mechanical×lnS  
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– 0.123×Motors×lnS + 0.0302× Synthetic resins×lnS.30 
Table 5 shows the resulting estimated elasticity of patenting as a function of R&D 
for firms of various sizes in our sample.  The elasticity averages somewhat less than 0.5 
for the entire sample (n=125), and across the firm sizes ranges between 0.41 and 0.55. 31 
With reference to the pioneering work, discussed next, of Scherer on this topic, 
our calculated patenting elasticities follow, with respect to firm size, an inverted-U 
relationship. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The literature has often presented descriptive statistics for the elasticity of R&D 
output—as measured by patenting—with respect to firm size.  We can complement those 
observations by calculating an elasticity of patenting with respect to firm size where the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Recall from the discussion of the specification of Table 4 that the technology 
categories not included in the elasticity equation here did not have an effect on the 
relationship between firm size and the impact of R&D on patents. 
31 Scherer (personal correspondence, July 22, 2016) has an insightful observation about 
the elasticities that we observe for our small firms: “I’m puzzled by the strong tendency 
toward diminishing R&D – patent returns, with elasticities in a range around 0.5.  I 
wonder if the following metaphor is plausible?  When one undertakes an SBIR project, 
one seems to be working on the technological and commercial working out of a particular 
idea. In a sense, one is doing R&D on a more or less bounded technological set, and 
when one applies more resources to a bounded objective, diminishing returns almost 
surely apply.  When on the other hand firms, large or small, decide what technological 
objectives they will pursue with their R&D, the set is virtually unbounded, and a 
tendency toward diminishing returns is much less compelling.   This could explain the 
difference between your results and my own earlier finding for samples of typically 
larger firms toward more or less constant returns.”  We find the metaphor plausible, 
although we note also that Bound et al. (1984), discussed below, find essentially the same 
elasticities as ours for their small firm sample while observing their patenting and R&D 
at the level of the firm.  Perhaps the R&D portfolios of their small firms are more like a 
focused R&D project than a collection of projects.  See also the discussion in Griliches 
(1990, pp. 1674-1677) about the different elasticities for samples of small firms versus 
those for large firms.  In particular, observe that we do not have the selection problem for 
our sample of small firms that Griliches discusses for the sample of small firms in Bound 
et al. (1984) where all of the small firms were successful in the sense that they were 
publicly traded firms, yet our elasticity estimates are essentially the same as the ones 
found there (and discussed by Griliches, 1990, p. 1675) for the small firms.  
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calculated elasticity is grounded in Section 2’s theory of how firm size affects R&D 
output. 
















'= β2 lnR+β3B lnR+β4A lnR+β5PhI lnR+β6PhII lnR+ τ jTjj≠1∑ lnR  
Now, to estimate this in sample using the second specification in Table 4, again 
using the actual observations in the sample, we form the elasticity for each R&D project 
as:   
0.0330×lnR – 0.0279×B×lnR – 0.0302×A×lnR – 0.00494×PhI×lnR + 
0.0156×PhII×lnR + 0.0323×Calculators×lnR – 0.0368×Electro-
mechanical×lnR – 0.123×Motors×lnR + 0.0302×Synthetic resins×lnR.   
Table 5’s last column shows the resulting estimated elasticity of patenting as a 
function of firm size for firms of various sizes in our sample.  
Observe in Table 5’s last column that the elasticity of patenting with respect to 
firm size is “all over the place” even within size classes.  That is exactly what theory tells 
us to expect, because the effect of firm size depends on the degree to which the R&D 
project is Schumpeterian in the cost or value senses.  For example, for the eight projects 
that are not particularly Schumpeterian in the cost or value senses because the underlying 
variables that we use to distinguish Schumpeterian projects are not characteristics of the 
projects (i.e., A = B = PhI = PhII = 0 and the project is not in one of the four significant 
technologies that affect the impact of firm size), we have ∂P ∂S( ) S P( )  = 0.445 with 
standard deviation = 0.00889 and a minimum of 0.433 and a maximum of 0.455.   
Turning to cases with various mixtures of Schumpeterian characteristics, for the 
45 projects where A = 1 and B = 0 and therefore we hypothesized the R&D would be less 
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Schumpeterian, we find that elasticity of patenting with respect to firm size is especially 
low; its mean equals 0.198 (and exhibits skewness, with standard deviation = 0.298).   
When PhII is high relative to PhI, we hypothesized that the R&D would be more 
Schumpeterian.  Forming the ratio of PhII to PhI plus 1 in order to have a metric for 
relatively high PhII, for the 48 projects where the ratio exceeds its mean, the elasticity of 
patenting with respect to firm size averaged 0.384, with standard deviation = 0.345.  For 
the 77 cases where the ratio is less than its mean, the elasticity averages –0.0501, with a 
large standard deviation of 0.484.  For the 17 projects where the ratio is between its mean 
and a standard deviation more than its mean, the elasticity averages 0.247, with standard 
deviation = 0.331.  For the 31 projects where the ratio is more than a standard deviation 
above its mean, the elasticity averages 0.459 with standard deviation 0.334.  
For the actual observations in our sample, the elasticity of patenting with respect 
to firm size decreases as the projects become less Schumpeterian and increases as they 
become more Schumpeterian. 
We now compare our results for the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D 
investment for firms of different sizes to prominent results in the literature about the 
elasticity of patents across the distribution of firm sizes.  Table 6 provides an overview of 
selected articles, with descriptions of their samples and their findings to which we 
compare our own sample and results. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Scherer (1965, pp. 1110-1111) provides a careful assessment of the various 
possibilities for differences in the propensity to patent across the size distribution of 
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firms, and he succinctly explains (1965, p. 1103) the literature’s focus on the elasticity of 
patenting with respect to firm size: 
Does patenting increase more than proportionately with firm size, less than 
proportionately, or is the relationship essentially linear?  Disciples of Schumpeter 
argue that inventive output ought to increase more than proportionately with firm 
size due to the scale economies and more effective incentives associated with 
bigness.  Others have postulated the opposite relationship, pointing mainly to the 
stultifying effects of bigness on incentives and initiative. 
 
Scherer (1965, pp. 1110) finds: 
Where significance is doubtful by traditional standards, one may incline toward 
the Scotch verdict that corporate patenting has not been shown to increase either 
more or less than proportionately with sales.  But if the regressions are accepted 
as best estimates of some true behavioral pattern, it would appear that after a stage 
of slightly increasing returns extending to 1955 sales of approximately $500 
million, corporate patenting tends to increase less than proportionately with sales, 
except in the case of a few giant firms which lead their two-digit sectors in sales.  
The least vigorous patent recipients relative to their size appear to be non-leader 
firms with sales over $500 million. 
 
Then, Scherer (1965, p. 1114) makes this inference relevant for antitrust policy: 
In conclusion, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that corporate bigness 
is especially favorable to high inventive output.  If anything the results show that 
firms below the half-billion dollar sales mark generate more inventions relative to 
their size than do giant firms. . . [T]he observed tendencies are less than 
completely uniform. It is also possible that large size does confer advantages for 
the development and integration of complicated “systems”—activities less likely 
to yield patentable inventions.  Small firms at the same time may enjoy a 
comparative advantage at inventing and developing the more readily patentable 
component parts for such systems.  My results do suggest, however, that a heavy 
burden of proof must be sustained by firms emphasizing research and 
development potential as a justification (i.e., in merger cases) for bigness. 
 
One possibility to be considered in antitrust policy applications is the following:   
For a given amount of R&D, a larger firm may be able to apply its R&D-generated 
knowledge to greater output (and hence spread its R&D cost over more output) than 
would a smaller firm; thus, less than proportional increases in R&D output as firm size 
increases are consistent with increasing private and social returns to the R&D conducted 
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by the larger firms (Cohen and Klepper, 1992, 1996a, 1996b).32  As seen in Kohn and 
Scott (1982, p. 248), when the relations between the various elasticity propositions are set 
out, the fact that the elasticity of patents with respect to firm size is less than 1.0 does not 
imply that the elasticity of the R&D value added with respect to firm size is also less than 
1.0.  
Observe first that our results in Table 5 complement Scherer’s results by 
examining the elasticities for a sample of small R&D-intensive firms in 2005, whereas 
Scherer’s classic study from 50 years earlier examined a sample of very large firms, all of 
which were in the Fortune 500 list of the largest U.S. corporations in 1955.  Across the 
distribution of firm sizes for our small firms, the elasticity of patenting with respect to 
R&D is largest—that is the elasticity roughly peaks in an inverted-U sense—when the 
firms are in the middle of the range of sizes for the small firms.33  As with Scherer’s 
(1965) study of large firms, beyond a point, size does not appear to confer an advantage 
for inventive output, despite the fact that our measure of firm size—the firm’s 
employment—is the measure that most favors finding support for the Schumpeterian 
firm-size hypothesis.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This would be the case for R&D investments in process innovations if such innovations 
are more effectively used in-house by the firm—for example, because licensing or sale of 
the technology are less effective—and if smaller firms cannot grow to take advantage of a 
larger size when exploiting their innovations.  
33 The inverted-U relationship here should not be confused with Scherer’s inverted-U in 
the relationship between R&D activity and seller concentration.  For Scherer’s 
description—both the seminal theory and the seminal empirical observation—of that 
inverted-U, see Scherer (1967a, p. 530, 1967b, pp. 391-392) and Scherer (1980, p. 437) 
with explicit reference to the “∩ -shaped relationship” at Scherer (1980, note 116, p. 
437). 
34 Scherer (1965, p. 1103) observes: “[T]he neo-Schumpeterian bigness contention 
receives greatest support when total employment is chosen as the scale measure and least 
when assets are chosen.”  Scherer then uses the sales measure because of its more neutral 
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Second, as observed earlier, we emphasize that our elasticity estimates are 
remarkably similar in magnitude to those found by Bound et al. (1984) in a study of “as 
complete a cross section as possible of U.S. firms in the manufacturing sector which 
existed in 1976” for which “[t]he final sample consists of 2595 firms, of which 1492 
reported positive R&D in 1976” (Bound et al., 1984, pp. 21, 24).  For our sample of small 
R&D-intensive firms, from Table 5 we see that the elasticity of patenting with respect to 
R&D ranged from 0.41 to 0.55.  Bound et al. (1984, Table 2.10, p. 49) divide (on the 
basis of R&D expenditures) their sample into small (n = 2102) and large (n = 480) firms 
and use the negative binomial model.  They report that the elasticity was 0.37 for the 
smaller firms and 0.53 for the largest firm within the small firm group.  Thus, for their 
small firm group, their estimates are very close to our own estimates for the small firms 
in our sample. 
For the Bound et al. (1984) group of large firms, the elasticity was 0.85 for the 
smallest of the large firms and 0.59 for the very large firms; the latter had R&D that was 
50 times greater than the smallest of the firms in the large firm group.  Bound et al. 
(1984, p. 48) tentatively conclude that patenting increases more or less proportionately 
with R&D over the range of sizes from the smallest (R&D > $2 million) to those with 
$100 million in R&D, and then, at some point after that size, diminishing returns sets in 
for the firms in the group of large firms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
characterization of firm size.  As explained earlier, we use the employment measure of 
firm size because we can observe employment for our small R&D-intensive firms at the 
time of the proposal for the Phase II project—before any sales ultimately resulting from 
the project’s R&D output will be observed (and for many of our young entrepreneurial 
firms before they have established sales).  The small firms in our sample are special in 
many ways (as discussed in Section 3), and certainly they are very different from the very 
large firms in Scherer’s seminal study. 
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To complete the comparisons of our findings with those in the literature, the 
analysis in Scherer (1983a; 1984a, pp. 227-235; 1984b) provides the elasticity of 
patenting with respect to the size of the line of business (a firm’s operations in a 
particular industry, distinguished from the other industries in which the firm produces).  
Scherer worked with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Line of Business (LB) 
Program’s data for 443 large manufacturing corporations with their operations in 1974 
observed across 276 standardized industry categories (reduced to 249 for Scherer’s 
purposes).   
On average, each of the 443 firms operated in 9.6479 of the 276 standardized 
industries; thus, together they provided reports on 4,274 individual lines of business 
(LBs).  With allowance made for multiple LBs of origin, because of central research labs 
having inventions applicable to multiple LBs, Scherer linked patents to LB R&D 
expenditures by observing the U.S. invention patents obtained by each firm from June 
1976 through March 1977.  In that period, the companies obtained 15,112 U.S. invention 
patents (more than 60 percent of all patents issued to U.S. industrial corporations during 
the period).  The patents linked to each company’s 1974 R&D expenditures were then 
linked to the specific LBs in which they originated, making the aforementioned 
allowance for multiple LBs of origin.   
Scherer estimates both nonlinear patenting on R&D regressions and nonlinear 
patenting on sales regressions (Scherer, 1984a, pp. 229-230): 
The dependent variable is the count of patents received by a line of business . . . .  
The size of an LB (i.e., the independent variable) is measured by its 1974 sales (in 
millions of dollars).  To take into account the fact that some industries enjoy richer 
opportunities to perform R&D and make patentable inventions than others, each 
industry category (of 249) with five or more nonzero observations on the dependent 
variable was allowed to have its own best-fitting regression equation. 
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“There were 124 industries in which five or more LBs had nonzero patenting” 
(Scherer, 1984a, p. 234).  For those 124 industries, Scherer finds (1984a, Table 11.4, p. 
234) no significant departure from the constant returns case with unitary elasticity for the 
elasticity of patenting on line of business sales for 73.4 percent (n = 91) of the industries.  
Increasing returns appeared for 11.3 percent (n = 14), while decreasing returns appeared 
for 15.3 percent (n = 19) of the industries.   
Examining the patenting on R&D regressions, he found (1984a, Table 11.5, p. 
235) the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D to be insignificantly different from 
1.0 for 59.7 percent of the industries, greater than 1.0 for 15.3 percent, and less than 1.0 
for 25 percent.  Scherer (1983a, p. 115) concludes: “Thus, the preponderant pattern is 
toward essentially constant returns in the patent output — R&D input relationship.  To 
the extent that there are deviations, they tend to be more on the side of diminishing rather 
than increasing returns.”35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Cohen and Klepper (1996a) use Scherer’s patent data linked to the FTC Line of 
Business Program’s data to develop support for “the basic idea that larger firms have an 
advantage in R&D because of the larger output over which they can apply the results and 
thus spread the costs of their R&D” (1996a, p. 241).  Note this point is the one discussed 
above with caveats about the antitrust policy implications of the diminishing returns 
observed in the patenting to R&D relationship.  Cohen et al. (1987) examine R&D 
expenditures as a function of a firm’s sales in a line of business and also firm-wide sales.  They 
use the FTC Line of Business Program’s data and replicate the dominant result in Scherer 
(1984a, Table 11.3, p. 233, 1984b).  Scherer controls for appropriability and 
technological opportunity conditions by estimating the elasticity of R&D with respect to 
line of business sales separately for each industry.  He finds that the elasticity is unity for 
over seventy percent of the industries.  Cohen et al. eliminate outliers from the FTC 
sample, examine the sample a whole, and find that controlling for industry effects, or 
instead controlling for the variance in conditions of appropriability and opportunity with 
their interesting industry-level variables, R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D to line of 
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Acs and Audretsch (1988) use, instead of patents, a different measure of 
innovative output: the number of innovations in each four-digit SIC industry in 1982, as 
tabulated by the U.S. Small Business Administration based on information in technology, 
engineering, and trade journals.  Examining the relationship between innovative output 
and R&D at the industry level, Acs and Audretsch find that the number of innovations 
increases with increased industry R&D expenditures but at a decreasing rate.  They also 
find (1988, p. 687) “. . . ceteris paribus, the greater extent to which an industry is 
comprised of large firms, the greater will be the innovative activity, but that increased 
innovative activity will tend to emanate more from the small firms than from the large 
firms.  Perhaps this indicates that, in industries comprised predominately of large firms, 
the existing small firms must resort to a strategy of innovation in order to remain viable.” 
6. Conclusion   
This paper complements the extant literature about the Schumpeterian firm-size 
hypothesis by: 
 examining the effect on R&D performance of different firm sizes across the 
distribution of sizes for small R&D-intensive firms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
business sales) is not affected by the size of line of business sales.  In other words, the 
elasticity of R&D to line of business sales is unity, which is what Scherer found for 71.4 
percent of the industries.  The outliers that Cohen et al. eliminate are reminiscent of the 
very large firms that were also outliers (Scherer, 1965, p. 1110) in Scherer’s original 
study, discussed above, some 20 years before his studies that use the FTC data.  Cohen et 
al. add that the probability of doing R&D is greater when lines of business have greater 
sales.  They also report that total size (an aggregation of all of a firm’s lines of business) 
does not affect R&D intensity significantly either, given appropriate controls; in other 
words, R&D increases proportionately with firm size for the sample of very large firms 
absent the outliers, consistent with the finding of Bound et al. (1984) for their large firm 
sample, and moreover, consistent with Scherer’s (1965, p. 1110) “Scotch verdict.”  
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 examining R&D and patenting at the R&D project level rather than at the level 
of the line of business, the firm, or the industry 
 controlling for the effects of rivalry by having a sample of R&D-intensive small 
firms with variance in their sizes but, as explained in Section 3, with all of the 
firms facing vigorous competition from many other firms that also use engineers 
and scientists and R&D resources more generally to provide commercial research 
services to develop new technologies in response to the requests for research from 
a single U.S. government agency  
 controlling for the endogeneity of firm size (that would make it difficult to 
disentangle the impact of firm size on R&D activity) by using the information 
about the firm’s size just before the beginning of each of the R&D projects 
 providing a Schumpeterian firm-size hypothesis test of the theory that the 
elasticity of R&D output with respect to the size of the firm will be greater when 
the R&D activity is more Schumpeterian in the cost sense and in the value sense  
 
 We find that for small research-intensive firms the elasticity of patenting with 
respect to R&D investment is about 0.5—essentially what has been found in the earlier 
literature examining small R&D-intensive firms.  Further, the estimated elasticity varies 
roughly in an inverted-U pattern across the different sizes for our small firms from 0.41 
to 0.55.  We also find that for our sample of firms the mean elasticity of patenting with 
respect to firm size for subsamples grouped by size is quite small for the research-
intensive firms that we observe and does not vary systematically with firm size.  Perhaps 
the finding is not, at least with hindsight, surprising given that all of our firms are small, 
R&D-intensive firms; consequently there is no observed advantage to size per se in such 
a sample.  However, as explained by Kohn and Scott (1982) that traditional way of 
looking for the effect of firm size may be the wrong way, and, consistent with their 
theory that the elasticity will vary with the extent to which the R&D activity is 
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Schumpeterian in the cost and/or value sense, we do find that the elasticity of patenting 
with respect to firm size decreases as the projects become less Schumpeterian and 
increases as they become more Schumpeterian. 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank William S. Comanor, F.M. Scherer, and Lawrence J. 




Acs, Z.J., & Audretsch, D.B. (1988). Innovation in large and small firms: An empirical 
analysis. American Economic Review, 78(4), 678-690. 
Baldwin, W.L., & Scott, J.T. (1987). Market structure and technological change. Chur; 
London; Paris; New York: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Bound, J., Cummins, C., Griliches, Z., Hall, B.H., & Jaffe, A. (1984).  Who does R&D 
and who patents? In Z. Griliches (Ed.), R&D, patents, and productivity (pp. 21-
54).  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Cohen, W.M. (2010). Fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and 
performance. In B.H. Hall & N. Rosenberg (Eds.), Economics of innovation: 
Handbook on the economics of innovation, vol. 1 (pp. 129-213). Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Cohen, W.M., & Klepper, S. (1992). The anatomy of industry R&D intensity 
distributions. American Economic Review, 82(4), 773-799. 
Cohen, W.M., & Klepper, S. (1996a). Firm size and the nature of innovation within 
industries: The case of process and product R&D. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 78(2), 232-243. 
Cohen, W.M., & Klepper, S. (1996b). A reprise of size and R&D. The Economic Journal, 
106(437), 925-951. 
Cohen, W.M., Levin, R.C., & Mowery, D.C. (1987). Firm size and R&D intensity: A re-
examination. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 543-565. 
	   	   34	  
Comanor, W.S. (1967). Market structure, product differentiation, and industrial research. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81(4), 639-657. 
Comanor, W.S., & Scherer, F.M. (1969). Patent statistics as a measure of technical 
change. Journal of Political Economy, 77(3), 392-398. 
Greene, W.H. (2012). Econometric analysis, Seventh Edition. Boston: Prentice Hall. 
Griliches, Z. (1990). Patent statistics as economic indicators: A survey. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 28(4), 1661-1707. 
Harhoff, D., Narin, F., Scherer, F.M., & Vopel, K. (1999). Citation frequency and the 
value of patented inventions. Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(3), 511-515. 
Harhoff, D., Scherer, F.M., & Vopel, K. (2003). Citations, family size, opposition and the 
value of patent rights. Research Policy, 32(8), 1343-1363. 
Henderson, R., & Cockburn, I. (1996). Scale, scope, and spillovers: The determinants of 
research productivity in drug discovery. RAND Journal of Economics, 27(1), 32-
59. 
Jankowski Jr., J.E. (1993). Do we need a price index for industrial R&D? Research 
Policy, 22(3), 195-205. 
Kohn, M., & Scott, J.T. (1982). Scale economies in research and development: The 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. Journal of Industrial Economics, 30(3), 239-249. 
Link, A.N. (1980). Firm size and efficient entrepreneurial activity: A reformulation of the 
Schumpeter hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 88(4), 771-782. 
Link, A.N., & Scott, J.T. (2009). Private investor participation and commercialization 
rates for government-sponsored research and development:  Would a prediction 
market improve the performance of the SBIR Programme? Economica, 76(302), 
264-281.   
Link, A.N., & Scott, J.T. (2012). Employment growth from public support of innovation 
in small firms. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. 
Link, A.N., & Scott, J.T. (2013). Public R&D subsidies, outside private support, and 
employment growth. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 22(6), 537-
550. 
	   	   35	  
Lunn, J., & Martin, S. (1986). Market structure, firm structure, and research and 
development. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 26(1), 31-44. 
Pakes, A., & Griliches, Z. (1984). Patents and R&D at the firm level: A first look. In Z. 
Griliches (Ed.), R&D, Patents, and Productivity (pp. 55-72). Chicago:  University 
of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ravenscraft, D.J., & Scherer, F.M. (1987). Mergers, sell-offs, & economic efficiency. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Scherer, F.M. (1965). Firm size, market structure, opportunity, and the output of patented 
inventions. American Economic Review, 55(5), 1097-1125. 
Scherer, F.M. (1967a). Market structure and the employment of scientists and engineers. 
American Economic Review, 57(3), 524-531. 
Scherer, F.M. (1967b). Research and development resource allocation under rivalry. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81(3), 359-394. 
Scherer, F.M. (1970). Industrial market structure and economic performance, First 
Edition. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Scherer, F.M. (1980). Industrial market structure and economic performance, Second 
Edition. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Scherer, F.M. (1983a). The propensity to patent. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 1(1), 107-128. 
Scherer, F.M. (1983b). Concentration, R&D, and productivity change. Southern 
Economic Journal, 50(1), 221-225. 
Scherer, F.M. (1984a). Innovation and growth: Schumpeterian perspectives. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Scherer, F.M. (1984b). Technological change and the modern corporation. In B. Bock, 
H.J. Goldschmid, I.M. Millstein, & F.M. Scherer (Eds.) The impact of the modern 
corporation (pp. 270-297).  New York: Columbia University Press. 
Scherer, F.M. (2009). The political economy of patent policy reform in the United States. 
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 7(2), 167-216.  
Scherer, F.M., Harhoff, D., & Kukies, J. (2000). Uncertainty and the size distribution of 
rewards from innovation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 10(1), 175-200. 
	   	   36	  
Scherer, F.M., & Ross, D. (1990). Industrial market structure and economic performance, 
Third Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Schmookler, J. (1966). Invention and economic growth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
Scott, J.T., & Scott, T.J. (2014). Innovation rivalry: Theory and empirics. Economia e 
Politica Industriale, 41(1), 25-53. 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2016. Classification standards and 
development, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-
search/classification-standards-and-development, USPC class numbers and titles, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm, Classes 
within the U.S. classification system arranged by related subject matter, 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resources/classification/classesco
mbined.pdf .  Accessed June 10, 2016. 
Wessner, C. W. (Ed.) (2000).  The Small Business Innovation Research Program:  An 
assessment of the Department of Defense Fast Track Initiative.  Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press.  
	   	   37	  




















	   	   38	  
Table 1.  The DOE Sample of Phase II SBIR Projectsa 
 
Total Phase II projects for DoD, NIH, NASA, DOE, and NSF for 1992-2001  11,214 
Total DOE Phase II projects, 1992-2001              808 
 
     Total DOE Phase II projects for firms with 1 project           136 
 Surveyed DOE Phase II projects for firms with 1 project           136 
     Did not respond                 96 
     Did respond                40 
 Randomly sampled               136 
 Sample weight                1.00b 
 
     Total DOE Phase II projects for firms with 2 projects                     86 
 Surveyed DOE Phase II projects for firms with 2 projects              85 
     Did not respond                62 
     Did respond                23 
 Randomly sampled                  85 
 Sample weight                1.01c  
 
     Total DOE Phase II projects for firms with > 2 projects          586 
 Surveyed DOE Phase II projects for firms with > 2 projects          218 
     Did not respond          124 
     Did respond            94 
 Randomly sampled              215d  
 Sample weight             2.73e 
 
 
NOTES:   
aTotal DOE projects = 136 + 86 + 586 = 808; total DOE surveyed = 136 + 85 + 218 = 439; 
total DOE randomly surveyed = 136 + 85 + 215 = 436; the 40 + 23 + 94 = 157 responses minus 
the 3 cases added to the sample = 154 responses from the random sample. 
b136/136 = 1, and 1/1 = 1. 
c85/86 = 0.9884, and 1/0.9884 = 1.01. 
dAfter taking the random sample, 1 project was added to the sample at the request of the firm that 
received the award and then 2 projects were added by the National Research Council research 
team to ensure that known “big successes” (over $10 million in sales and subsequent investments) 
were in the sample.  Hence, 218 – 3 = 215. 
e215/586 = 0.3669, and 1/0.3669 = 2.73. 
 
Source: Link and Scott (2012, Table B1, pp. 128-130).   
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Table 2 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
P Number of patent applications as of 2005, the year of the NRC survey 
R R&D investment in the Phase II projects ($2015) 
S Firm employees at the time of its Phase II proposal to DOE 
B Binary variable if the firm had a founder with a business background 
A Binary variable if the firm had a founder with an academic background 
PhI Number of previous Phase I projects in a technology area related to the 
current Phase II project 
PhII Number of previous Phase II projects in a technology area related to the 
current Phase II project 
T  Binary variable for the technology research area of the Phase II project 
NE Binary variable if the firm in located in the Northeast Census region 
MW Binary variable if the firm is located in the Midwest Census region 
South Binary variable if the firm is located in the South Census region 
West Binary variable if the firm is located in the West Census region 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statisticsa 
Variable n Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
P 146 0.829 1.62 0 13 R 143 2,353,115 4,827,214 538,002 41,900,000 
S 146 32.6 59.0 1 451 
B 141 0.426 0.496 0 1 
A 141 0.610 0.490 0 1 
PhI 143 2.01 5.81 0 65 
PhII 143 0.923 1.60 0 12 
Geographic Region 
NE 142 0.282 0.451 0 1 
MW 142 0.141 0.349 0 1 
South	   142 0.162 0.370 0 1 
West 142 0.415 0.495 0 1 
Technology effects 
Calculators 135 0.111 0.315 0 1 
Chemical 
Processing 
135 0.289 0.455 0 1 
Compositions 135 0.0444 0.207 0 1 
Earth Working 135 0.0296 0.170 0 1 
Electricity 135 0.0741 0.263 0 1 
Electro-
Mechanical 
135 0.0296 0.170 0 1 
Heating & 
Cooling 




135 0.00741 0.0861 0 1 
Machine 
Elements 
135 0.00741 0.0861 0 1 
Measuring & 
Testing 
135 0.230 0.422 0 1 
Motors 135 0.0148 0.121 0 1 
Nano-
technology 
135 0.0148 0.121 0 1 
Software 135 0.00741 0.0861 0 1 
Stock 
Materials 
135 0.0519 0.223 0 1 
Super-
conductors 
135 0.0519 0.223 0 1 
Synthetic 
Resins 
135 0.0296 0.170 0 1 
aThese summary statistics are for the subset of the observations for which we have the patenting 
variable.  For example, we have more projects than 141 for which we know whether or not the 
project had academic founders, but there are only 141 projects with that information and also the 
information about patenting.  For another example, of the 146 observations with the information 
for the variable P, only 135 have the technology classification variable, even though we have 143 
observations that have technology classifications (8 of the 143 do not have the patent 
variable).  Although we have the patent variable and the technology classifications variable for 
135 observations (so, if we ran the model of P as a function of technology alone we would have n 
= 135), we have only 125 observations that have P, technology, and all of the other variables that 
we use in the models of Table 4. 
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Table 4. Negative Binomial Model for P.a 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Rln  0.446 (0.115)*** 0.472 (0.0959)*** 0.477 (0.0943)*** 
lnS × lnR  0.0268 (0.0160)* 0.0330 (0.0140)** 0.0355 (0.0138)*** 
B× lnS × lnR  –0.0252 (0.0203) –0.0279 (0.0168)*  –0.0295 (0.0169)* 
A× lnS × lnR  –0.0251 (0.0169)# –0.0302 (0.0150)** –0.0336 (0.0156)** 
PhI × lnS × lnR  –0.00473 (0.00278)* –0.00494 (0.00224)** –0.00534 (0.00249)** 
PhII × lnS × lnR  0.0164 (0.00958)* 0.0156 (0.00852)* 0.0173 (0.00914)* 
Calculators
× lnS × lnR  
 0.0323 (0.0208)# 0.0315 (0.0211)# 
Electro-mechanical
× lnS × lnR  
 –0.0368 (0.0230)# –0.0422 (0.0219)* 
Motors× lnS lnR   –0.123 (0.347) –0.159 (0.350) 
Synthetic Resins
× lnS lnR  
 0.0302 (0.0451) 0.0159 (0.377) 
B  1.42 (0.753)* 1.46 (0.722)** 1.57 (0.743)** 
A  0.779 (0.771) 0.997 (0.722) 1.11 (0.738)# 
PhI  0.277 (0.167)* 0.295 (0.138)** 0.297 (0.158)* 
PhII  –0.772 (0.429)* –0.686 (0.409)* –0.725 (0.444)# 
Geographic Regionb  
NE  0.0455 (0.334) –0.0770 (0.342)  
MW  –0.883 (0.577)# –0.847 (0.543)#  
South  –0.0754 (0.380) –0.217 (0.419)  
Technology effectsc  
Calculators –0.758 (0.469)# –1.86 (0.792)** –1.86 (0.812)** 
Chemical Processing –0.217 (0.373)   
Compositions 0.444 (0.632)   
Earth Working 0.0566 (0.451)   
Electricity 0.572 (0.433)   
Electro-Mechanical 1.02 (0.448)** 2.64 (0.979)*** 2.77 (0.799)*** 
Motors –30.0 (0.800)*** –22.4 (10.9)** –19.0 (11.0)* 
Nano-technology 0.364 (0.535)   
Stock Materials –0.0355 (0.570)   
Superconductors 0.0265 (0.633)   
Synthetic Resins –1.69 (1.03)* –2.42 (1.71) –2.09 (1.59) 
Miscellaneousd –0.680 (0.709)   
Constant –7.84 (1.69)*** –8.45 (1.27)*** –8.77 (1.29)*** 
Auxiliary parameter: 
alphae 
1.02x10-7 (6.98x10-8) 1.18x10-7 (1.16x10-7) 2.18x10-7 (2.41x10-7) 
n 125 125 125 
Log pseudo likelihood –248.29  –250.62  –254.67 
Wald chi-squared (df) 2781.7 (25)*** 2164.9 (21)*** 1783.9 (18)*** 
aThe model is estimated with the sample weights (also called probability weights) shown in Table 1 and 
with standard errors adjusted for 98 clusters by firm; standard errors are in parentheses.. The significance 
levels for two-tailed tests are indicated as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  To provide information 
about parameters that were marginally significant, # indicates p-values for the two-tailed test that were > 
0.10 but < 0.15. 
bThe effect for the region West is left in the intercept. 
cThe effect for the technology Measuring and testing is left in the intercept. 
dThis category is composed of the four technologies (Heating and cooling, Life and agriculture science, 
Machine elements, and Software) that each have only a single observation in the sample; for one of the 
projects P= 1, and the other three projects have P= 0. 
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e	  Because alpha is essentially 0 (the 95% confidence interval for alpha is 0.0000000265 to 0.000000390 for 
the first specification, 0.0000000172 to 0.000000811 for the second), and 0.0000000248 to 0.00000191 for 
the third), the Poisson estimator would do just as well as the negative binomial.  The Poisson distribution is 
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Table 5. Mean Patenting Elasticities with respect to R&D and Firm Sizea 
 
































0 < S <10  61 0.488 (0.0515) [0.00659] 
{0.475-0.501} 
0.168 (0.409) [0.0523] 
{0.0628-0.272} 
9 < S < 20  14 0.471 (0.112) [0.0298] 
{0.407-0.536} 
–0.00944 (0.627) [0.168]  
{–0.372-0.353}  
19 < S < 30  13 0.520 (0.112) [0.0309] 
{0.453-0.588} 
0.200 (0.514) [0.142]  
{–0.111-0.510} 
29 < S < 50  14 0.545 (0.0761) [0.0203] 
{0.501-0.588} 
0.267 (0.294) [0.0786] 
{0.0970-0.437} 
49 < S <100  8 0.493 (0.102) [0.0361] 
{0.408-0.578} 
0.0795 (0.367) [0.130]  
{–0.227-0.386} 
99 < S < 200  11 0.408 (0.232) [0.0701] 
{0.252-0.565} 
–0.202 (0.730) [0.220] 
{–0.692-0.288} 
199 < S ≤ 451  4 0.446 (0.258) [0.129] 
{0.0353-0.856} 
–0.0634 (0.640) [0.320] 
{–1.08-0.954} 
0 < S ≤ 451  125 0.488 (0.110) [0.00983] 
{0.468-0.507} 
0.117 (0.483) [0.0432] 
{0.0311-0.202} 
    
aStandard deviation in parentheses; standard error in brackets and 95% confidence intervals in 
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Table 6.  Selected Descriptive Evidence about the Nexus of Patents, R&D, and Firm Size 
Article Sample Aggregation 
Level 
Findings 
Scherer (1965) Sample of the largest 
U.S. corporations (all 
from the Fortune 
500) in 1955 (n = 
448); each firm’s 
patents received in 
1959, and its sales, 
R&D employment 
and total 




by broad (2-digit 
SIC) industries, 
and also in 
broader 
groupings 
Patenting (patents received in 
1959) increases slightly more 
than proportionately with firm 
size (measured by sales in 
1955) up to a point, and then 
increases less than 
proportionately except for a few 
giant firms.a 
Bound, et al. 
(1984) 
Sample of U.S. firms 
in the manufacturing 
sector in 1976 (n = 
2595 firms); each 
firm’s 1976 patent 









Elasticity of patents with 
respect to R&D = 0.55 at $100 
thousand in R&D and = 0.66 at 
$1 billion in R&D (n = 2582) 
(p. 46).  Dividing the sample 
into small and large firms by 
their R&D, for the small firms 
(R&D less than $2 million or 
missing, n = 2102), the 
elasticity = 0.37 at $100 
thousand in R&D and = 0.53 at 
$2 million in R&D; for the 
large firms (R&D greater than 
$2 million, n = 480), the 
elasticity = 0.89 at $2 million in 
R&D and = 0.59 at $100 
million in R&D (p. 49).b  
“[T]entative conclusion is that 
there are nearly constant returns 
to scale in patenting throughout 
the range of R&D above $2 
million, with decreasing returns 
setting in some place above 




U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission Line of 
Business Program 
sample of the largest 
U.S. corporations in 
1974 (n = 443); 
4,274 line of 
business (LB) 
observations for the 
1974 R&D 
expenditures for the 
firms; 15,112 U.S. 
invention patents 
from June 1976 to 
Line of business 
(LB); LBs 
grouped by 
industries (at the 




“[T]he preponderant pattern 
is toward essentially constant 
returns in the patent output 
— R&D input relationship.  
To the extent that there are 
deviations, they tend to be 
more on the side of 
diminishing rather than 
increasing returns.” (1983a, 
p. 115) 
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March1977 linked to 
the 1974 LB R&D 
expenditures  
Present paper 
(Link and Scott) 
Sample of individual 
R&D projects begun 
1992-2001 for small 
U.S. R&D-intensive 
firms (n = 125); for 
each project, total 
R&D investment in 
2015 dollars and 
patent applications 
resulting as of 2005 
R&D project; the 
projects are for 
firms that all 














Across the distribution of firm 
sizes, the elasticity of patenting 
with respect to R&D ranged 
from 0.41 to 0.55 with the 
elasticities being largest for 
intermediate levels of firm size 
and also varying directly with 
the extent to which the projects 
are Schumpeterian in the cost 
or value senses. 
aAlso, from Table 3, p. 1104, with firms ranked by sales, patenting increases somewhat more 
proportionately with R&D (measured as R&D employees) than with firm size, although still with 
some suggestion of diminishing returns. 
bThese results are for the negative binomial model; Bound et al. also examines the data with other 
models without the treatment of the patent variable as a count variable, including OLS with 
dummy variables to handle the cases of zero patents and zero R&D.  The negative binomial 
results for Bound et al. are for all firms grouped together and without the industry dummies.  
After carefully examining the OLS results with the industry dummies, Bound et al. (1984, p. 42) 
observe: “Although we believe that there are significant differences in the relationship of R&D 
and patenting at the detailed industry level from inspection of the distribution of the two variables 
by industry, these differences do not affect the basic results of this aggregate study.  We have 
therefore omitted the industry dummies for the sake of simplicity in what follows.” 
 
 
